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HOLDING THE PRESIDENT ACCOUNTABLE
TO CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
Louis Fisher*
Abstract
As with Congress and the judiciary, presidents have access to
powers expressly stated in the Constitution and those necessarily implied
in those grants. In highly limited circumstances, presidents may also
exercise a “prerogative” (i.e., unilateral action), but that authority is
frequently misunderstood and subject to abuse. Unlike those in the other
branches, presidents lay claim to a host of powers far beyond
enumerated and implied powers. In seizing steel mills in 1952 to
prosecute the war in Korea, President Harry Truman acted on what he
called an “inherent” power that was not subject to judicial or legislative
checks. Presidents Richard Nixon and George W. Bush relied on the
same argument. All three presidents were rebuffed by Congress, the
courts, and the general public. A lengthy list of other powers, all
designed to broaden executive power beyond constitutional sources,
include the “sole organ” doctrine; the “unitary executive”; and various
powers called “emergency,” “plenary,” “residual,” “preclusive,” and
“completion.” These vague categories need to be carefully analyzed to
understand why they exceed constitutional limits and endanger selfgovernment and the system of checks and balances.
INTRODUCTION
Presidential influence expanded after World War II in large part by asserting
executive authority beyond powers expressly enumerated or implied in the
Constitution. Over the past six decades, presidential studies have promoted a
fictional and idealized model of the office, describing the President as someone
devoted to the “national interest” and surrounded by advisers with uncanny
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drawn from the Author’s treatise The Law of the Executive Branch: Presidential Power,
published by Oxford University Press in January 2014. Some of the early sections of the
book appear at http://books.google.com/books?id=ZbBNAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover
#v=onepage&g&f=false.
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expertise and political judgment. 1 This Article argues that it would be
constitutionally healthy to treat the presidency in a more realistic light and place
greater value on the system of checks and balances. Few people idealize Congress.
There are occasional efforts to idealize the Supreme Court as an institution with
unrivaled competence to interpret the Constitution, but judicial errors throughout
the last two centuries are widely known and acknowledged. The principal risk to
constitutional government comes from conceptual mistakes about the source of
presidential authority. Contributing to the increase of executive power is the failure
of Congress to protect its institutional powers.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the executive and legislative
branches’ enumerated and implied powers. Part II argues that the purported
“inherent” presidential powers are distinct from implied powers and do not
conform to the Constitution. Part III gives examples of presidents invoking their
prerogative to take unilateral action. Parts IV and V argue that the Supreme Court
has erroneously applied—and lower federal courts have confirmed—overly broad
and defective doctrines of executive power. Part IV discusses the “unitary
executive” doctrine; Part V discusses the “sole organ” doctrine. Finally, Part VI
shows that presidents often overstep their constitutional powers by substituting the
approval of international bodies for the approval of Congress when dealing with
international disputes and military action.
I. ENUMERATED AND IMPLIED POWERS
On a regular basis, the Supreme Court describes the U.S. Constitution as one
of “enumerated powers.” 2 Those announcements suggest that every power granted
to the national government is expressly stated in the Constitution and that anything
beyond powers specifically enumerated lacks legitimacy. In McCulloch v.
Maryland, 3 Chief Justice John Marshall instructed, “This government is
acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it can
exercise only the powers granted to it . . . is now universally admitted.” 4 The
reality, however, is that the federal government has never been limited to
enumerated powers. All three branches require and exercise implied powers.
The Framers fully understood the need for implied powers. James Madison
wrote in Federalist No. 44, “No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in
reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever
a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing
it is included.” 5 When the First Congress debated the Bill of Rights, some
1

Louis Fisher, Teaching the Presidency: Idealizing a Constitutional Office, 45 PS:
POL. SCI. & POL. 17, 17 (2012).
2
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 1, 2 (2012); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
3
17 U.S. 316 (1819).
4
Id. at 405.
5
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 322 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
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lawmakers wanted to limit the national government to powers expressly delegated.
The Articles of Confederation, which became effective in 1781, gave broad
protection to the states, which retained all powers except those “expressly
delegated” to the national government. 6
A member of the First Congress proposed that the Tenth Amendment limit the
national government to powers “expressly delegated.” 7 The constitutional language
would read, “The powers not expressly delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” 8 Madison objected to the word “expressly” because
the functions and duties of the federal government could not be delineated with
such precision. 9 It was impracticable to confine government to express powers, for
there “must necessarily be admitted powers by implication, unless the Constitution
descended to recount every minutiae.” 10 Madison’s argument prevailed; lawmakers
agreed to delete the word “expressly.” 11
Another constitutional dispute in the First Congress highlighted the need for
implied powers. The Constitution does not give the President authority to remove
executive officials, but lawmakers faced this question: What would happen if a
department head was unwilling or unable to carry out a statutory duty? Could the
President remove that individual? Legislative debate, frequently referred to as the
“Decision of 1789,” 12 occupies almost 200 pages of the Annals of Congress.
Madison proposed the creation of three executive departments: Foreign Affairs,
Treasury, and War. At the head of each department would be a secretary appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and removable by the
President. 13 William Smith of South Carolina opposed giving the President the sole
power of removal. 14 Madison justified the removal power as a way to make the
President responsible for the conduct of department heads. 15 Theodorick Bland
wanted the removal power shared with the Senate to make it consistent with the
appointment process. 16 The House rejected his motion. 17
6

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION art. II, reprinted in MERRILL
JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIALCONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 263 (5th prtg. 1963).
7
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 761 (1789).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021,
1022 (2006).
13
Id. at 1029–30.
14
Id. at 1030.
15
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 387 (1789).
16
Id. at 397.
17
Id. For a summary of the leading arguments and the votes taken, see LOUIS FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 57–62 (6th ed.
2014).
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Lawmakers decided to acknowledge the President’s removal power indirectly.
Subordinate officers would be responsible for taking charge and custody of all
records whenever the secretary “shall be removed from office by the President of
the United States.” 18 Congressional support for the removal of department heads
did not mean the President was at liberty to remove all subordinate executive
officials. In debating the Treasury Department and its Office of the Comptroller,
Madison said it was necessary “to consider the nature of this office.”19 To him, its
properties were not “purely of an Executive nature.” 20 He maintained that “they
partake of a Judiciary quality as well as Executive.” 21 Because of the mixed nature
of the office, “there may be strong reasons why an officer of this kind should not
hold his office at the pleasure of the Executive branch of the Government.”22
Although implied powers were recognized in debates over the Constitution
and in the early years of the national government, judicial rulings continued to
describe the Constitution as one of enumerated powers. That position is not
credible. If the federal government is limited to enumerated powers, where did the
judiciary receive the power of judicial review? It is not expressly provided. In
1821, the Supreme Court decided whether Congress possessed authority to hold
individuals in contempt, a power that does not appear in the Constitution. 23 A
unanimous Court acknowledged that within the Constitution there is not “a grant
of powers which does not draw after it others, not expressed, but vital to their
exercise.” 24 Without the power of contempt, Congress would be “exposed to every
indignity and interruption that rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may meditate
against it.” 25
The contemporary Supreme Court continues to champion the doctrine of
enumerated powers. In 1995, in striking down a congressional effort to regulate
guns in schoolyards, the Court announced, “We start with first principles. The
Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.” 26 That is not a
first principle. If it were, there would be no judicial authority to invalidate the
statute. Two years later, the Court stated, “Under our Constitution, the Federal
Government is one of enumerated powers.” 27 Some powers are enumerated, but
the federal government is more than that. In his decision in 2012 upholding the
Affordable Care Act, Chief Justice Roberts made this claim: “If no enumerated
power authorizes Congress to pass a certain law, that law may not be

18

Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65, 67 (1789).
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 611 (1789).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 611.
23
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 224–25 (1821).
24
Id. at 225–26.
25
Id. at 228. For the implied power of federal courts to hold individuals in contempt,
see Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65–66 (1924).
26
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
27
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997).
19
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enacted . . . .” 28 Congressional power has never been limited in that manner. All
three branches possess implied powers that can be drawn reasonably from
enumerated powers.
II. POWERS SAID TO BE “INHERENT”
Scholars at times refer to “inherent” presidential power when the more
accurate word is implied. For example, in a study on treaties and international
agreements, Oona Hathaway states that “the President has the power to make
international agreements entirely on his own inherent constitutional authority. Yet
that power is not unlimited.” 29 The very definition of inherent power is that it
inheres in an office and therefore is not subject to limits. She explains that
limitations are not supplied by international law but by domestic law, and in the
United States, “the central source to which we must turn is the U.S. Constitution,
which is the source of both the President’s unilateral international lawmaking
authority and the limits thereon.” 30 In other words, the authority is a mix of express
and implied powers, not inherent powers.
Some scholars treat implied powers and inherent powers as the same. 31 They
are quite different. Implied powers are drawn reasonably from express powers.
They are therefore anchored in the Constitution. By definition, inherent powers are
not drawn from express powers. As the word suggests, they consist of powers that
“inhere” in a person or an office. Black’s Law Dictionary has defined inherent
power in this manner: “An authority possessed without its being derived from
another . . . . [P]owers over and beyond those explicitly granted in the Constitution
or reasonably to be implied from express grants.” 32 Inherent power is clearly set
apart from express and implied powers.
The Constitution is protected when presidents act under express and implied
powers. It is at risk when they claim inherent powers. A constitution protects
individual rights and liberties by specifying and limiting government. Express and
implied powers serve that purpose. Inherent powers invite claims of authority that
have no limits other than those voluntarily accepted by the President. What
“inheres” in the President? At times the word “inherent” is cross-referenced to
“intrinsic,” which can be something “belonging to the essential nature or
construction of a thing.” 33 What is in the “nature” of a political office and
“essential” to it? Nebulous words and concepts encourage unilateral presidential
actions that lack constitutional authority and endanger individual liberties. Inherent
powers move the nation from one of limited powers to boundless and ill-defined
28

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 1, 3 (2012).
Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the
Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 210 (2009).
30
Id. at 211.
31
See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 20, 430 (2008).
32
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 703 (5th ed. 1979).
33
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 614 (10th ed. 1965).
29
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authority, undermining republican government, the doctrine of separation of
powers, and the system of checks and balances. 34
Presidents who claimed inherent powers have been turned back by Congress,
the courts, or both: Truman trying to seize steels mills in 1952 to prosecute the war
in Korea, Richard Nixon impounding appropriated funds and ordering warrantless
domestic surveillance, and George W. Bush after the 9/11 terrorist attacks claiming
the right to unilaterally create military tribunals without first obtaining authority
from Congress.
A. Truman’s Steel Seizure
On April 8, 1952, President Truman issued Executive Order 10340,
authorizing and directing the secretary of commerce to take possession of eightyseven steel plants, facilities, and other property of private companies “as he may
deem necessary in the interests of national defense.” 35 He acted to avert a
nationwide strike of steel companies. The executive order referred to “American
fighting men and fighting men of other nations of the United Nations . . . now
engaged in deadly combat with the forces of aggression in Korea.” 36
On April 17, a reporter at a news conference asked, “Mr. President, if you can
seize the steel mills under your inherent powers, can you, in your opinion, also
seize the newspapers and/or the radio stations?” 37 President Truman responded,
“Under similar circumstances the President of the United States has to act for
whatever is for the best of the country. That’s the answer to your question.” 38
Public opinion turned against this definition of presidential power. Newspapers
across the country warned that “dictatorial powers” were “dangerous,” “ugly,”
“fear-inspiring,” and “a constitutional and political crisis.” 39
Several steel companies took the dispute to federal district court. Holmes
Baldridge of the Justice Department defended the steel seizure as “a legal taking
under the inherent executive powers of the President.” 40 For constitutional
authority he cited the “executive power” that Article II vests in the President, the
Take Care Clause, the Commander in Chief Clause, and “that [the President] shall

34

See Louis Fisher, Invoking Inherent Powers: A Primer, 37 PRES. STUD. Q. 1, 1–2
(2007) [hereinafter Invoking Inherent Powers]; Louis Fisher, The Unitary Executive and
Inherent Executive Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 569, 586–90 (2010) [hereinafter The
Unitary Executive].
35
Exec. Order 10340, 3 C.F.R. 861, 862 (1949–1953).
36
Id. at 861.
37
The President’s News Conference of April 17, 1952, 98 PUB. PAPERS 269, 272–73
(Apr. 17, 1952).
38
Id.
39
98 CONG. REC. 4033–34 (1952).
40
The Steel Seizure Case, H.R. DOC. NO. 534, pt. 1, at 253 (1952). This document
contains proceedings in district court and the D.C. Circuit.
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be the sole organ of the nation in its external relations.” 41 Judicial misconceptions
about the sole-organ doctrine are covered in Part V.
In district court, Baldridge told Judge David A. Pine that the court had no
authority to rule against the President: “Our position is that there is no power in the
Courts to restrain the President . . . .” 42 Baldridge agreed that the government was
not asserting any statutory power. Instead, the President’s power was based on
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Article II “and whatever inherent, implied or residual powers
may flow therefrom.” 43 He recognized only two limitations on the President: “One
is the ballot box and the other is impeachment.” 44 Emphasizing how earlier
presidents had successfully invoked “inherent” power, 45 Baldridge concluded his
argument with two more references (for a total of eleven) to presidential inherent
power. 46
On April 29, Judge Pine ruled against President Truman’s action in seizing
the plants. He found no express or implied constitutional authority for the seizure.
No “residuum of power” or “inherent” power, he said, existed to justify this
exercise of emergency power for the good of the public. 47 To Judge Pine, the scope
of presidential power described by Baldridge “spells a form of government alien to
our Constitutional government of limited powers.” 48
On May 3, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral argument on
May 12. Solicitor General Philip Perlman, presenting the case for the executive
branch, did not refer one time to “inherent presidential power.” 49 On June 2, by a
6–3 vote, the Supreme Court struck down President Truman’s executive order. 50
The majority consists of the opinion by Justice Black, 51 followed by concurrences
from Justices Frankfurter, 52 Douglas, 53 Jackson, 54 Burton, 55 and Clark. 56 All six
Justices rejected the claim of inherent presidential power in this instance.57 Chief
Justice Vinson, joined by Justices Reed and Minton, defended President Truman
41

Id. at 255.
Id. at 362.
43
Id. at 371.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 386.
46
See id. at 426–27.
47
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 573 (D.D.C. 1952).
48
Id. at 576.
49
48 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer) 877–995
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). With other parties, the Justices debated
the existence of inherent presidential powers. E.g., id. at 986–94.
50
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 667 (1952).
51
Id. at 582–89.
52
Id. at 593–628 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
53
Id. at 629–34 (Douglas, J., concurring).
54
Id. at 634–55 (Jackson, J., concurring).
55
Id. at 655–60 (Burton, J., concurring).
56
Id. at 660–67 (Clark, J., concurring).
57
See supra notes 51–56.
42
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but largely on the basis of legislatively approved policies, treaty obligations (the
UN Charter), and military appropriations. 58
B. Nixon’s Impoundments
“From [1789] forward, Presidents were not required to spend every dollar that
Congress appropriated. Some appropriation accounts were purely discretionary,
such as contingency funds. Presidents had no obligation to spend all the money.” 59
An early precedent, cited by the Nixon administration in 1973 to justify its
ambitious impoundment policy, 60 was the decision by President Thomas Jefferson
in 1803 to withhold $50,000 for gunboats. 61 However, there was no controversy.
He explained to lawmakers that the Louisiana Purchase made it unnecessary to
immediately spend the money. 62 He took time to study the most recent models of
gunboats and later informed Congress that he was implementing the program. 63
Some impoundments challenge the ability of Congress to set national policy
and decide budget priorities. House Appropriations Chairman George Mahon
remarked in 1949 that members of Congress did not object to any reasonable
economies in government: “But economy is one thing, and the abandonment of a
policy and program of the Congress another thing.” 64 From 1940 through the
1960s, presidents collided with Congress by refusing to spend appropriated funds,
with many impoundments affecting military programs. 65 Impoundments continued
during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, but political
accommodations resolved the disputes. 66
The Nixon administration ratcheted up the stakes. 67 On January 31, 1973,
President Nixon claimed that the “constitutional right for the President of the
United States to impound funds—and that is not to spend money, when the
58

Id. at 667–72 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: PRESIDENTIAL POWER 237
(2014); see also Roy E. Brownell II, The Constitutional Status of the President’s
Impoundment of National Security Funds, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1, 27–30 (2001).
60
Impoundment of Appropriated Funds by the President: Joint Hearings Before the
Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Impoundment of Funds of the Comm. on Gov’t Operations & the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 676–77
(1973) (statement of Joseph Cooper, Professor) [hereinafter Impoundment Hearings].
61
FISHER, supra note 59, at 237.
62
Thomas Jefferson, Third Annual Message (Oct. 17, 1803), in 1 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 345, 348 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
63
Id. at 360. For a discussion of the historical background to President Jefferson’s
action, see Impoundment Hearings, supra note 60, at 676–77.
64
95 CONG. REC. 14922 (1949) (statement of Rep. Mahon).
65
See Brownell II, supra note 59, at 38, 42–45.
66
Id.
67
See JAMES P. PFIFFNER, THE PRESIDENT, THE BUDGET, AND CONGRESS:
IMPOUNDMENT AND THE 1974 BUDGET ACT 40–44 (1979); Louis Fisher, Funds Impounded
by the President: The Constitutional Issue, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 124, 125–26 (1969);
Louis Fisher, Impounded Funds: Uses and Abuses, 23 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 141 (1973).
59
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spending of money would mean either increasing prices or increasing taxes for all
the people—that right is absolutely clear.”68 He vowed not to spend money “if the
Congress overspends.” 69 Officials in his administration claimed that impoundment
was consistent with the President’s “constitutional authority in the area of foreign
affairs, his role as Commander in Chief, and his constitutional duty to ‘take care
that the laws be faithfully executed.’” 70 Deputy Attorney General Joseph Sneed
insisted that the President’s constitutional powers to impound funds find their
source not only in the Take Care Clause and his “express status as Commander-inChief” but as the “sole organ of the Nation in the conduct of its foreign affairs.” 71
The Nixon administration repeatedly invoked President Jefferson’s
withholding of funds for gunboats as a legitimate precedent. Questioned by a
Senate committee on impoundment actions, Housing and Urban Development
Secretary George Romney replied, “I guess Thomas Jefferson started this.” 72
Actions by Presidents Jefferson and Nixon were worlds apart. President Jefferson
delayed spending money but eventually purchased gunboats to carry out statutory
policy. President Nixon claimed the constitutional right to cut programs in half and
eliminate them altogether. The severity of those reductions prompted dozens of
lawsuits, with the administration losing almost all of them. 73
Both houses worked on impoundment control bills. Title X of the Budget Act
of 1974 created two categories of impoundment: “rescissions” (actions to terminate
funds) and “deferrals” (proposals to delay spending). 74 Congress prohibited
presidents from cancelling a program unless Congress specifically granted its
approval by statute. 75 For deferrals, lawmakers agreed that Congress could
disapprove by something short of a public law. 76 The choice of legislative action
was a one-house veto. 77 The Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha struck
down the legislative veto and thus invalidated the one-house veto for deferrals. 78
However, the D.C. Circuit, in a later decision, ruled that the one-house veto was
tied inextricably to the deferral authority. 79 If one fell, so did the other. The
68

The President’s News Conference of January 31, 1973, 1 PUB. PAPERS 53, 62 (Jan.
31, 1973).
69
Id.
70
Impoundment Hearings, supra note 60, at 271 (statement of Roy Ash, DirectorDesignate, Office of Management and Budget).
71
Id. at 369 (statement of Joseph T. Sneed, Deputy Att’y Gen.).
72
Department of Housing and Urban Development; Space, Science, Veterans, and
Certain Other Independent Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1973: Hearings on
H.R. 15093 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong. 565 (1972)
(statement of Sec’y George Romney).
73
LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 177, 189–201 (1975).
74
Id. at 199; Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-344, § 1011(3)–(4), 88 Stat. 297.
75
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, § 1012.
76
Id. § 1013.
77
Id.
78
462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
79
City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 906–09 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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President’s authority to make policy deferrals thus disappeared. Only routine,
nonpolicy deferrals are permitted. Congress promptly converted the judicial ruling
into statutory policy. 80
C. Nixon’s Domestic Surveillance
On June 5, 1970, President Nixon met with the heads of several intelligence
agencies, including the National Security Agency (NSA), to initiate a program
designed to monitor what the administration considered radical individuals and
groups in the United States, particularly opponents of the Vietnam War. 81 What
became known as the Huston Plan directed the NSA to use its technological
capacity to intercept—without judicial warrant—the communications of U.S.
citizens using international phone calls or telegrams. 82 Under pressure from FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover, President Nixon withdrew this plan. 83
However, the NSA had been targeting domestic groups for several years and
continued to do so. 84 The Huston plan, kept in a White House safe, became public
in 1973 after Congress investigated the Watergate affair and discovered that
President Nixon had ordered the NSA to illegally monitor American citizens.85 To
conduct its surveillance operations, the NSA entered into agreements with U.S.
companies, including Western Union and RCA Global. 86 U.S. citizens, assuming
their telegrams were strictly private, learned that American companies had been
turning them over to the NSA. 87
In 1972, a district court expressly dismissed the claim of a broad “inherent”
presidential power to conduct domestic surveillances without a warrant. 88 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the government’s argument that the power at issue
“is the inherent power of the President to safeguard the security of the nation.” 89
Unanimously, the Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit and held that the
Fourth Amendment required prior judicial approval for surveillances of domestic
organizations. 90

80
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Affirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-119, § 206, 101 Stat. 785.
81
JAMES BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS: ANATOMY OF THE ULTRA-SECRET NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY 430 (2002).
82
Id.
83
Id. at 430–31.
84
Id. at 431.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 434–38.
87
Id. at 438–39.
88
United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1077 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
89
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 444 F.2d 651, 658 (6th
Cir. 1971) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 318–21
(1972).
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Building on those decisions, Congress passed legislation to provide statutory
policy for the President’s power to conduct surveillance over foreign powers. The
result was the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.91 The
assertion of inherent presidential power now faced a judicial check. FISA
established a special court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to ensure
independent supervision of executive power. FISA made clear that the statutory
procedures for electronic surveillance within the United States for intelligence
purposes “shall be the exclusive means” for conducting such surveillance.92
D. Bush’s Military Tribunal
On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush issued a military order to
create military tribunals to try individuals who gave assistance to the terrorist
attacks of 9/11. 93 The administration justified the order on the ground of
presidential inherent power. 94 As with claims by other presidents, Bush’s assertion
of inherent power would fail.
The constitutionality of President Bush’s action reached the Supreme Court in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 95 It held that President Bush’s military order violated both
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions. 96 Congress had
enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and it was the President’s duty to
comply with it. No inherent presidential authority existed to circumvent statutory
policy. In this litigation, I filed three amicus briefs to oppose the Bush
administration: when the case was with the D.C. Circuit, when a motion had been
filed for certiorari, and after the Court granted certiorari. 97
To the Bush administration, founding-era history justified independent
presidential power to create military tribunals: “When the Constitution was written
and ratified, it was well recognized one of the powers inherent in military
command was the authority to institute tribunals for punishing enemy violations of
the law of war” and that General Washington had appointed a Board of General
91

Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered titles of
U.S.C.).
92
Id. § 201(f). For more contemporary issues on electronic surveillance, see Louis
Fisher, National Security Surveillance: Unchecked or Limited Presidential Power?, in
CONTEMPORARY CASES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 378–408 (Ralph G. Carter ed., 5th ed.
2014).
93
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
94
See Fisher, Invoking Inherent Powers, supra note 34, at 12.
95
548 U.S. 557 (2006).
96
Id. at 557–58.
97
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Officers in 1780 to try British Major John André as a spy. 98 The Justice
Department asserted that “there was no provision in the American Articles of War
for court-material proceedings to try an enemy for the offense of spying.” 99
Those arguments were in error. As my briefs explained, the Continental
Congress adopted a resolution in 1776 expressly providing that enemy spies “shall
suffer death . . . by sentence of a court martial, or such other punishment as such
court martial shall direct,” and ordered the resolution “be printed at the end of the
rules and articles of war.” 100 A year earlier, Congress made it punishable by court
martial for members of the Continental Congress to “hold correspondence with” or
“give intelligence to” the enemy. 101 The Bush administration displayed little
understanding of history by relying on the John André trial of 1780. There was no
President at that time. There was no separate executive branch. There was only one
branch of government: the Continental Congress. In convening Major André’s
trial, Washington did not act unilaterally as an executive possessing inherent power
but as a military general carrying out procedures established by Congress. Other
military tribunals were created after 1789, raising important questions about
presidential power and judgment. 102
III. INVOKING THE PREROGATIVE
Inherent power is at times associated with the prerogative power: an
independent executive power to act in a time of emergency. They are quite
different. Under inherent power, the President claims authority to act without any
interference from other branches. The prerogative accepts that the executive may at
times take the initiative, but only with the understanding that the President
recognizes he is not acting under the law and will need Congress to approve his
action.
President Jefferson exercised the prerogative when he decided to exceed the
instructions of Congress in purchasing territory from France. After receiving
legislative authority to pay as much as $10 million for New Orleans and the
Floridas, he learned that Napoleon Bonaparte was prepared to sell all of Louisiana
because he needed money to fight Great Britain. On April 30, 1803, France ceded
the vast territory of Louisiana for $15 million. The Senate approved the Louisiana
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treaties, and the United States took possession of 828,000 square miles, doubling
the size of the nation. 103
President Jefferson never claimed authority to act as he did. He wondered if a
constitutional amendment might be required. 104 Instead of fabricating a strained
constitutional theory to justify his action, he asked Congress for legal support and
received it. Particularly because of the “constitutional difficulty,” he thought it
might be best for Congress to engage in “as little debate as possible.” 105 In a letter
to Attorney General Levi Lincoln, President Jefferson decided that a constitutional
amendment was not necessary or advisable: “the less that is said about any
constitutional difficulty, the better; and that it will be desirable for Congress to do
what is necessary, in silence.” 106
John Yoo, in a study of executive power from George Washington to George
W. Bush, stated that President Abraham Lincoln “never invoked the
prerogative.” 107 Actually, the initiatives taken by President Lincoln at the start of
the Civil War are best described as exercising the prerogative. In a separate study,
Yoo said that when President Lincoln raised an army, withdrew money from the
Treasury Department, and launched a blockade on the South, he acted “on his own
authority.” 108 That is not correct. President Lincoln recognized that he did not have
constitutional authority to act as he did. For that reason, he was required to go to
Congress and seek retroactive authority.
When Congress returned on July 4, 1861, President Lincoln explained the
emergency actions he had taken, including raising an army and withdrawing
money from the Treasury. Clearly those powers are vested exclusively in Congress
by Article I. President Lincoln’s admission that he acted outside the law was clear
when he told lawmakers he believed his actions were not “beyond the
constitutional competency of Congress.” 109 In other words, he acknowledged using
both Article I and Article II powers. In this manner he relied on the following
103
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prerogative: the need in an emergency to act in the absence of law and sometimes
against it, with the requirement that he seek statutory authority from the legislative
branch. Congress passed legislation that “approved and in all respects legalized
and made valid, to the same intent and with the same effect [all the acts,
proclamations, and orders of the President, etc.] as if they had been issued and
done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the
United States.” 110
The destroyers-for-bases deal of 1940 is sometimes described as an example
of presidential prerogative and even the exercise of inherent authority. In a
message to Congress on September 2, 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
announced he had entered into an agreement to transfer fifty “over-age” destroyers
to Great Britain in return for receiving ninety-nine-year leases to a number of
British air and naval bases in North and South America. 111 Robert Shogan’s book
Hard Bargain carries this subtitle: How FDR Twisted Churchill’s Arm, Evaded the
Law, and Changed the Role of the American Presidency. It is an insightful study,
but the theme of illegality that pervades the book is never substantiated. Nowhere
does Shogan identify a law that Roosevelt evaded or violated.
The key law that Shogan discusses in some detail—the Walsh Amendment—
was complied with in full. Signed by Roosevelt on June 25, 1940, the amendment
provided that no U.S. military or naval weapon or equipment be transferred,
exchanged, sold, or otherwise disposed of unless the chief of naval operations and
the chief of staff of the Army “first certif[ied] that such material [was] not essential
to the defense of the United States.” 112 When Roosevelt sent his message to
Congress announcing the destroyers-for-bases deal, he forwarded several papers,
including the certification by Admiral Harold Stark. 113
IV. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE
Scholars offer varying accounts on what is called the Vesting Clause. Article
II, Section 1 begins, “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.” 114 What is the scope of that power? Does it include
powers specifically identified in the Constitution augmented by necessary implied
powers? Or is the “executive Power” a source of power that goes beyond
enumerated and implied powers? Some scholars, such as Steven Calabresi and
Kevin Rhodes, read the Vesting Clause to empower the President to exercise
exclusive control over the executive branch, creating a “Unitary Executive” that

110
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cannot be limited by Congress through means such as statutory provisions that
restrict the President’s power to remove executive officials.115
This interpretation is too broad because the President’s removal power was
restricted from the beginning. In 1789, when Congress created the Office of
Comptroller in the Treasury Department, it established an executive official who
did not serve at the pleasure of the President; instead, that official exercised an
independent capacity to ensure the legality of expenditures. 116 Moreover, the
nature of U.S. government places certain agency actions beyond presidential
control. That is especially true when statutory duties are vested with particular
executive officers (“ministerial” actions), during agency adjudication, and during
the rise of independent agencies. 117 The Constitution does not empower the
President to carry out the laws—that would impose an impossible assignment.
Instead, the President’s duty is to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.” 118 Many decisions remain legitimately outside the President’s direct
control, provided officials discharge their statutory tasks. 119 It would be
impermissible for presidents or White House aides to interfere with judgments by
executive officials regarding veterans’ benefits, social security payments, and
many other matters left to the departments and agencies assigned those statutory
duties. 120
In Marbury v. Madison, 121 Chief Justice Marshall drew an important
distinction between two types of executive duties, ministerial and discretionary. 122
With the latter, the heads of executive departments function purely as political
agents of the President, and courts will not interfere. 123 But executive officers also
receive legal duties assigned to them by Congress. Focusing on the secretary of
state, Chief Justice Marshall said when the office exercises ministerial duties, it
extends to the nation and the law. 124 By statutory command, Congress may direct
executive officers to carry out certain activities. When a secretary of state performs
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“as an officer of the United States,” he or she is “bound to obey the laws.” 125
Functioning in that capacity, the secretary acts “under the authority of law, and not
by the instructions of the president. It is a ministerial act which the law enjoins on
a particular officer for a particular purpose.” 126
Many opinions issued by attorneys general and federal courts have analyzed
ministerial/legal duties. In 1823, Attorney General William Wirt advised President
James Monroe about the scope of his control over agency accounting officers. 127
The laws regulating the settlement of public accounts required auditors in the
Treasury Department to receive and examine accounts, and certify them to the
comptrollers, who then examined them and reached a judgment. 128 Although the
Constitution requires the President to “take care that the laws be faithfully
executed,” Wirt said the President is not expected to execute each law by
himself. 129 If officers under his supervision fail to carry out their duties, the
President needs to see they are “displaced, prosecuted, or impeached.” 130 But it
“could never have been the intention of the constitution, in assigning this general
power to the President to take care that the laws be executed, that he should in
person execute the laws himself,” a demand Wirt called “an impossibility.” 131
If auditors and comptrollers “continue to discharge their duties faithfully,” the
President “has no authority to interfere.” 132 Any person dissatisfied with the
comptroller’s decision may, under law, appeal within six months. 133 At that point,
“the right of appeal stops; there is no proviso for an appeal to the President.” 134 In
subsequent years, Wirt had frequent occasion to instruct President Monroe that he
had no business being involved in the settlement of accounts. 135 He said that
interference by the President “in any form would, in my opinion, be illegal.” 136 It
“would be an unauthorized assumption of authority for [the President] to interfere
in the case in any manner whatever.” 137 Two opinions by Wirt in 1825 reinforced
that conclusion. 138
In 1831, Attorney General Roger Taney advised President Andrew Jackson
that a dispute over the decision of the Treasury Department about a government
contractor must be left to Congress. An appeal could not be submitted to the
125
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President. The power to provide relief “resides in Congress; and to them, in my
opinion, the application must be made.” 139 Other attorneys general have provided
the same advice to presidents. 140
Litigation requiring officials in the administration to comply with statutory
duties are generally directed at the heads of executive departments. 141 They can
also be aimed at the President. In 1974, an appellate court held that President
Nixon had violated the law by refusing to carry out a statute designed to regulate
federal pay. It was his obligation either to submit to Congress a pay plan
recommended by the salary commission or offer an alternative proposal. President
Nixon failed to do either. The court said the law required him to do one or the
other. President Nixon had no constitutional authority to ignore statutory policy. 142
V. SOLE-ORGAN DOCTRINE
In the 1936 Curtiss-Wright decision, Justice Sutherland included extraneous
material to develop the doctrine that the President is the “sole organ” of foreign
affairs and has a range of constitutional authority that is exclusive and plenary. 143
The doctrine seems to come with impressive credentials. It relies on a speech given
in 1800 by John Marshall when he served in the House of Representatives. 144 A
year later he became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.145 Yet Chief Justice
Marshall never took the position that Justice Sutherland attributed to him. Justice
Sutherland’s argument is not only mere dicta. It is also plain judicial error.
In defending the secret warrantless surveillance program that President Bush
authorized after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, in violation of the FISA statute of
1978, the Justice Department relied in part on the sole-organ doctrine. It claimed
that the activities by the NSA “are supported by the President’s well-recognized
inherent constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and sole organ for the
139
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Nation in foreign affairs.” 146 It might have been “well-recognized” by some Justice
Department attorneys, but it has not been by anyone who has taken time to read
Marshall’s speech.
The issue in Curtiss-Wright involved legislative, not presidential, power: How
much may Congress delegate its power to the President in the field of international
affairs? In upholding the delegation, Justice Sutherland claimed that the principle
that the federal government is limited to enumerated and implied powers “is
categorically true only in respect to our internal affairs.” 147 In arguing for
independent and exclusive presidential powers in the field of foreign affairs,
Justice Sutherland relied on Marshall’s speech.
What Justice Sutherland and the Justice Department failed to understand is
Marshall’s purpose in giving his speech. Marshall never advocated inherent,
plenary, exclusive, or independent powers for the President in foreign affairs. 148
Some members of the House of Representatives wanted to censure or impeach
President John Adams for turning over to England a British subject charged with
murder. In his floor address, Marshall explained why no grounds existed to
sanction President Adams. The Jay Treaty provided for extradition in cases
involving the charge of murder. President Adams acted not on the basis of plenary
or inherent power but on express language in a treaty, with treaties under Article
VI of the Constitution included as part of the “supreme Law of the Land.” 149 He
was not making foreign policy independently. He was carrying out national policy
decided by both elected branches.
Reviewing his service as secretary of state and Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, it is apparent that Marshall never advanced any notion of inherent, plenary,
exclusive, or independent powers of the President in external affairs. As Chief
Justice, he looked solely to Congress in matters of war. 150 Marshall understood that
when a conflict arose between what Congress provided by statute and what a
President announced by proclamation, in time of war, the statute represents the law
of the nation. 151
146
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Although Justice Sutherland’s dicta is clear judicial error, federal courts
continue to cite the sole-organ doctrine to uphold broad definitions of presidential
power in foreign relations and support extensive delegations of legislative power to
the President. 152 Lower court judges, Supreme Court Justices, and their law clerks
appear never to read Marshall’s speech to form an independent and informed
judgment. The Supreme Court in 1972 described the President as authorized “to
speak as the sole organ” of the national government. 153 Authority to speak is not
equivalent to exclusive authority to make or formulate foreign policy.
A contemporary example of a court relying on the sole-organ doctrine to
promote exclusive presidential power occurred on July 23, 2013. The D.C. Circuit
ruled that congressional legislation in 2002 “impermissibly intrudes” on the
President’s power to recognize foreign governments. 154 The statute required the
secretary of state to record “Israel” as the place of birth on the passport of a U.S.
citizen born in Jerusalem if the parent or guardian so requests. 155 Four times the
court cited Justice Sutherland’s dicta in Curtiss-Wright describing the President as
the “sole organ” in external affairs. 156
In citing Curtiss-Wright and other rulings, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged it
was relying on judicial dicta. Citing language from one of its decisions in 2006, it
stated, “To be sure, the Court has not held that the President exclusively holds the
power [of recognition]. But, for us—an inferior court—‘carefully considered
language of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, generally must be
treated as authoritative.’” 157 There are two qualifiers: carefully and generally.
Justice Sutherland’s dictum was manifestly careless.
There is no doubt the Supreme Court regularly cites the sole-organ doctrine in
Curtiss-Wright, but no matter how often the Court repeats an error, it remains an
error and should not be used as an authoritative source to decide constitutional
issues. An error, by repetition, does not emerge as truth. Instead of endlessly
repeating errors, federal judges and the Supreme Court should take time to read
Marshall’s speech and correct Justice Sutherland’s misrepresentation. 158 It may be
embarrassing to admit that a Supreme Court decision issued in 1936 and cited
regularly as valid authority over the decades is nonetheless wrong. Failure to do so,
however, would reveal a Court willing to rest comfortably on faulty precedents.
152
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VI. EXTERNAL SUBSTITUTES FOR CONGRESS
From 1789 to 1950, presidents who wanted to take the country from a state of
peace to a state of war knew the Constitution required them to come to Congress to
obtain either a declaration or authorization. 159 That understanding radically
changed in June 1950 when President Harry Truman went to war against North
Korea without seeking congressional authority. President Truman did so by citing
“authorization” not from Congress but from the United Nations Security Council.
His precedent in circumventing Congress—and the Constitution—has been
followed by other presidents, including George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and
Barack Obama. In addition to accepting the Security Council as a substitute for
Congress, presidents also falsely claim “authorization” from NATO allies.
The constitutional issue can be appreciated by asking a series of questions.
May a treaty amend the Constitution? No. May a President and the Senate through
the treaty process (as with the UN Charter and NATO) create an international or
regional body that functions as a constitutional substitute for Congress? No. May a
treaty transfer the Article I authority of Congress to an organization outside the
United States? Again: No.
Under the UN Charter, each nation enters into “special agreements” to
commit troops and other military assistance to a UN force. On July 2, 1945, from
Potsdam, President Truman sent a cable to Senator Kenneth McKellar, who placed
it in the Congressional Record. The cable stated, “When any such agreement or
agreements are negotiated it will be my purpose to ask the Congress for
appropriate legislation to approve them.” 160 President Truman thus made a public
commitment that he would not act unilaterally but would seek advance support
from both houses of Congress through a bill or joint resolution.
Chapter VII of the UN Charter governs UN responses to threats of peace,
breaches of peace, and acts of aggression. Special agreements concluded between
the Security Council and member states “shall be subject to ratification by the
signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.” 161
Each nation therefore needed to determine its “constitutional processes.”
Parliamentary regimes might be inclined to vest that decision in the prime minister.
The United States had to decide its constitutional requirements.
After the Senate ratified the UN Charter, Congress debated the meaning of
“constitutional processes” for the United States. Section 6 of the UN Participation
Act, enacted on December 20, 1945, 162 authorized the President to negotiate a
special agreement with the Security Council, “which shall be subject to the
approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution,” providing for the
numbers and types of armed forces, their degree of readiness and general location,
159
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and other requirements. 163 Presidents could commit armed forces to the United
Nations only after Congress explicitly granted its approval by statute.164
Other limits on presidential authority to involve American troops in UN
military operations were included in amendments to the UN Participation Act in
1949. The statute permitted the President to unilaterally provide military forces to
the United Nations “for cooperative action,” yet this discretionary authority faces
stringent limitations. U.S. troops serve only for “peaceful settlement of disputes
and not involving the employment of armed forces contemplated by chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter . . . .” 165 They could serve only “as observers, guards,
or in any noncombatant capacity, but in no event shall more than a total of one
thousand of such personnel be so detailed at any one time.” 166 Nothing in the text
or legislative history of the UN Charter, the UN Participation Act, or the 1949
amendments authorized unilateral presidential decisions to commit U.S. troops to
an offensive action without prior congressional approval.
With statutory safeguards supposedly in place to protect congressional powers
and constitutional government, President Truman on June 26, 1950, spoke to the
American public about “unprovoked aggression [by North Korea] against the
Republic of Korea.” 167 He said the Security Council ordered a withdrawal of the
invading forces to positions north of the 38th parallel. 168 At that point, President
Truman did not commit U.S. forces to the conflict. A day later, however, after
North Korea failed to cease hostilities and withdraw to the 38th parallel, he ordered
U.S. air and sea forces to assist South Korea. 169
A July 3 memo by the State Department offered legal justifications for
unilateral presidential exercises of military force, including, “The President, as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, has full control
over the use thereof.” 170 From 1789 to 1950, no President argued that this clause
empowered him to take the country from a state of peace to a state of war. The
memo identified “many instances” where armed force was used by presidents to
protect American lives and property. 171 None of the examples involved offensive
military operations against another country.
In addition to relying on Security Council resolutions as a means of
authorizing military operations, presidents turned to NATO allies to sanction
163
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armed force against other nations. The same issue of defining “constitutional
processes” under Article 43 of the UN Charter applies equally well to language in
mutual-defense treaties. The NATO treaty was signed in 1949 by the United
States, Canada, and ten European countries. 172 Article 5 provides that “an armed
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered
an attack against them all.” 173 It further states that, in the event of an attack, NATO
countries may exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized
by Article 51 of the UN Charter and assist the country or countries attacked by
taking “such action as it deems necessary,” including use of armed force. 174 Article
11 of the treaty provides that it shall be ratified “and its provisions carried out by
the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.” 175
Mutual security treaties may not constitutionally transfer the war-making
power from Congress to the President, acting through such organizations as
NATO. Moreover, mutual security treaties were entered into for defensive
purposes. President Clinton in Bosnia and Kosovo, and President Obama in Libya,
used NATO military forces against countries that did not attack or threaten the
United States. 176 The operations were offensive, not defensive. Mutual security
treaties require action through “constitutional processes.” 177 Unilateral offensive
wars by the President lack any constitutional support.
By providing that the NATO treaty be carried out in accordance with
constitutional processes, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee “intended to
ensure that the Executive Branch of the Government should come back to the
Congress when decisions were required in which the Congress has a constitutional
responsibility.” 178 The treaty “does not transfer to the President the Congressional
power to make war.” 179 Congress reinforced that constitutional principle with
section 8(a) of the War Powers Resolution of 1973. 180 It provides that authority to
introduce U.S. forces into hostilities shall not be inferred “from any treaty
heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation
specifically authorizing” the introduction of American troops.181
As with President Truman, President George H. W. Bush claimed that a
resolution from the UN Security Council provided sufficient constitutional
authority to use military force against Iraq. After Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait
172

NATO, NATO IN FOCUS 11 (2013), available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natoliv
e/topics_81135.htm.
173
North American Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
See Fisher, supra note 1, at 25–29.
177
Id.
178
Richard H. Heindel et al., The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate,
43 AM. J. INT’L L. 633, 649 (1949).
179
Id. at 650; see also Michael J. Glennon, United States Mutual Security Treaties:
The Commitment Myth, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 509, 517–18 (1986).
180
Id. at 543.
181
War Powers Resolution of 1973, § 8(a)(2), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012).

2014]

HOLDING THE PRESIDENT ACCOUNTABLE

815

on August 2, 1990, President Bush sent several hundred thousand troops to Saudi
Arabia and the Middle East for defensive purposes. 182 His decision in November to
double the size of U.S. forces enabled him to wage offensive war. 183 He made no
effort to seek authority from Congress.
Instead, the administration sought support from the United Nations to take
offensive action against Iraq. On November 29, 1990, at the urging of the Bush
administration, the Security Council passed Resolution 678, authorizing member
states to use “all necessary means” to force Iraqi troops out of Kuwait. 184 Thomas
Franck, a specialist in international law, wrote an article for The New York Times
entitled Declare War? Congress Can’t. 185 In his view, once the Security Council
acts, member states have no grounds to wait and seek authority from their
legislatures. 186 Franck’s position is not supported by the language “constitutional
processes” in the UN Charter, the legislative history of the Charter, the text of the
UN Participation Act, or the U.S. Constitution.
On January 8, 1991, President Bush asked Congress to pass legislation
supporting his use of the military. When questioned by reporters the next day
whether he needed a statute from Congress, he replied, “I don’t think I need it. . . .
I feel that I have the authority to fully implement the United Nations
resolutions.” 187 Congress passed legislation authorizing offensive action against
Iraq. In signing the bill, Bush claimed he could act without statutory authority:
As I made clear to congressional leaders at the outset, my request for
congressional support did not, and my signing this resolution does not,
constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive
branch on either the President’s constitutional authority to use the Armed
Forces to defend vital U.S. interests or the constitutionality of the War
Powers Resolution. 188
His signing statement did not alter the fact that the resolution passed by Congress
authorized him to act. Law depends on what a signed bill provides, not what a
President says about it.
President Clinton circumvented Congress several times by citing “authority”
from the United Nations and NATO. On July 31, 1994, the Security Council
182
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adopted a resolution authorizing all member states, particularly those in the region
of Haiti, to use “all necessary means” to remove the military leadership on that
island. 189 On this occasion, the Senate spoke promptly and clearly by passing a
“sense of the Senate” amendment, stating that the Security Council resolution
“does not constitute authorization for the deployment of United States Armed
Forces in Haiti under the Constitution of the United States or pursuant to the War
Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148).” 190 The nonbinding amendment passed,
100 to 0. 191
On September 15, in a nationwide televised address, President Clinton
announced he was prepared to use military force against Haiti “to carry out the will
of the United Nations.” 192 He made no such commitment to the will of the United
States or requirements of the U.S. Constitution. An invasion became unnecessary
when former President Jimmy Carter helped negotiate an agreement to have the
military leaders in Haiti step down.193 House and Senate debates were strongly
critical of President Clinton’s belief that he could act militarily against Haiti
without statutory authority. Both houses passed legislation stating the “the
President should have sought and welcomed Congressional approval before
deploying United States Forces to Haiti.” 194
In 1993, President Clinton claimed legal support from both the Security
Council and NATO to order air strikes in Bosnia. As he explained the next year,
“The authority under which air strikes can proceed, NATO acting out of area
pursuant to U.N. authority, requires the common agreement of our NATO
allies.” 195 Through his reasoning, it was necessary to obtain approval from France,
Italy, and other NATO allies, but not from Congress. On September 12, 1995,
President Clinton claimed the bombing attacks were “authorized by the United
Nations.” 196 Toward the end of 1995, Clinton ordered twenty thousand American
ground troops to Bosnia. On no occasion did he request or receive statutory
authority for these military operations. 197
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By October 1998, Clinton was threatening the Serbs with air strikes on the
basis of NATO authority. 198 He did not request statutory support from Congress.
The House and Senate took several votes on concurrent resolutions, but such votes
have no legal value and cannot provide statutory authorization. Various votes were
taken but did not become law. 199 The war against Yugoslavia began on March 24,
1999, without any statutory or constitutional support.
In 2001 and 2002, President George W. Bush received advance authority from
Congress for the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq. 200 In 2011, President Obama
continued the pattern of initiating military action against another country without
congressional authorization. Although Libya had not threatened the United States
in any manner, he cited “authorization” from the Security Council to bomb air
defense systems and Libyan forces as part of a no-fly zone policy. 201 Later,
President Obama and administration officials spoke of receiving “authorization”
from NATO allies. 202 President Obama was the first President to conduct offensive
military operations beyond the ninety-day limit of the War Powers Resolution,
eventually stretching to seven months.
The administration concluded that the military operations did not constitute
“war” or “hostilities.” 203 An Office of Legal Counsel memo, in April 2011, argued
that in order to meet the constitutional meaning of war there had to be “prolonged
and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military
personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.” 204 According to that
interpretation, a nation with superior military force could pulverize another
country—including through the use of nuclear weapons—and there would be
neither war nor hostilities.
CONCLUSION
Federal courts continue to rely on judicial precedents that were false when
first issued and continue to lack legitimacy. A prominent example is Justice
198
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Sutherland’s misleading account in Curtiss-Wright of the President as “sole organ”
in external affairs, explained in Part V above. Although it is a favorite citation by
courts, executive officials, and scholars to promote plenary, independent,
exclusive, and inherent power for the President, nothing in John Marshall’s speech
provides any support for that position. A judicial error should not guide
constitutional interpretation.
It is well known that courts frequently err when citing precedents. Justice
Jackson observed in 1945, “Judges often are not thorough or objective
historians.” 205 More recently, in 1989, Justice Scalia stated that the judicial system
“does not present the ideal environment for entirely accurate historical inquiry.” 206
Relying on the experience with his own staff, he said courts do not “employ the
ideal personnel.” 207 In addition, in a book published after he left the Court, Justice
John Paul Stevens, observed that “judges are merely amateur historians” whose
interpretations of past events “are often debatable and sometimes simply
wrong.” 208 Even with these limitations, if federal judges want to rely on Marshall’s
sole-organ speech in 1800, they should take the time to read it and reach an
independent judgment. Simply repeating erroneous dicta is irresponsible.
In the Steel Seizure case of 1952, Justice Jackson objected to “nebulous,
inherent powers never expressly granted but said to have accrued to the
[presidential] office from the customs and claims of preceding administrations.”209
He added, “Loose and irresponsible use of adjectives colors all non-legal and much
legal discussion of presidential powers. ‘Inherent’ powers, ‘implied’ powers,
‘incidental’ powers, ‘plenary’ powers, ‘war’ powers and ‘emergency’ powers are
used, often interchangeably and without fixed or ascertainable meanings.” 210
Contemporary scholars have added other supposedly independent presidential
powers: “residual,” “preclusive,” “completion,” the “sole organ” doctrine, and the
“unitary executive.”
Those vague and often historically false assertions attempt to inflate
presidential power beyond the only legitimate sources of authority: enumerated
and implied. When properly understood, on very rare occasions a President may
exercise a prerogative power. For the last six decades, many scholars have
advanced theories of presidential power that exaggerate executive virtues and pay
little or no attention to presidential violations of public law, basic principles of
republican government, separation of powers, and constitutional checks and
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balances. 211 Other presidential scholars have effectively rejected this impulse for
hagiography. 212
From World War II to the present, Congress has demonstrated little interest in
protecting and comprehending its institutional powers, developing policy,
exercising oversight of the executive branch, and fighting off encroachments by
other branches. 213 From Harry Truman to Barack Obama, presidents repeatedly
claim the right to take the country from a state of peace to a state of war without
seeking authority from Congress. Unconstitutionally, they go to war by citing
approval from the UN Security Council and NATO.
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